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CORPORATE GROUP CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCIES 
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES & EUROPEAN UNION: 





As corporations become increasingly globalized, cross-border insolvencies 
are more prevalent. Insolvency raises the problems of any cross-border dispute: 
reciprocity, venue, choice of law, and cultural differences. However, unlike a 
typical adversarial dispute, successful insolvency proceedings do not have a 
single “winner,” and therefore raise unique problems. Insolvency’s goal of 
maximum private and public economic benefit is best achieved through 
cooperation, efficiency, and overall asset maximization. 
Disparate parties each fighting for their best private outcome would 
contravene a harmonious proceeding to achieve this goal. However, the 
absence of a universal insolvency law makes achieving harmony through 
cooperation across borders especially difficult. Each country has its own laws 
and procedures, and each citizen creditor has expectations based on their 
respective sovereign’s laws. Differences in these laws range from specific 
(such as priorities and dischargeable claims) to the overarching goals (such as 
creditor returns or job preservation).1 
Navigating these competing laws is a significant problem for corporate 
groups, or companies with many different entities comprising a larger entity. 
Corporate groups often have branches or separate legal entities in different 
countries and are therefore common in cross-border insolvencies. A successful 
corporate group insolvency would accomplish several key goals: (1) 
maximization of enterprise-wide value, (2) clarity and predictability in 
 
 ∗ Nora Wouters, Partner at McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP, http://www.mckennalong.com/ 
professionals-NoraWouters.html. 
 ∗∗ Executive Managing Editor, Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal; J.D., Emory University School 
of Law, with Honors (2013); Southeastern Bankruptcy Law Institute Scholar; American Bankruptcy Institute 
Medal of Excellence Recipient; B.S., Boston University (2007). 
 1 Harmonisation of Insolvency Law at EU Level, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 419.633 (2010).  
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applying the law, (3) treating similarly situated creditors equally, (4) 
procedural fairness, (5) protection of employment, and (6) respecting the 
separate legal status of entities.2 
The ideal way to achieve these goals would be through a single, centralized 
insolvency proceeding, but choosing the appropriate venue (COMI) for this is 
problematic. This centralized proceeding would provide oversight to ensure 
that these goals are pursued most effectively. A single proceeding would 
minimize costs, expedite the proceedings, provide a single forum for 
comparison of relevant options, discourage individual parties-in-interest from 
taking action beneficial to them but suboptimal for the entire corporate group, 
and ensure cooperation among all the parties. However, single proceedings 
face three impediments to implementation: (1) adhering to creditors’ rights and 
expectations under their country’s laws, so as to not discourage cross-border 
lending; (2) inducing creditors of diverse and conflicting interests to cooperate 
for collective asset maximization; and (3) respecting national sovereignty. 
In the U.S., corporate groups can have a single consolidated proceeding,3 
but there is no such mechanism for E.U. corporate groups. The European 
Insolvency Regulation (“EIR”), which dictates how its signees treat intra-E.U. 
insolvencies, does not explicitly address corporate groups. While a single, 
efficient proceeding is possible under the EIR, it is not legally prescribed. The 
difficulty of achieving a single efficient proceeding is exacerbated when a 
cross-border E.U.-U.S firm must coordinate proceedings under the EIR and the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “U.S. Code”). Unlike the U.S., the E.U. has no 
continent-wide system of courts. Moreover, the EIR grants its member states 
far more autonomy to apply local law than the U.S. Code grants its states. 
Reorganizations of corporate groups, treated as a single entity, have a 
greater chance at success than those treated as separate entities. A single 
proceeding affords economic efficiencies, lower administrative costs, and 
centralized control of restructuring. A standardized policy to guide cross-
border group insolvencies would provide predictability to creditors, increase 
the chances of successful restructuring, achieve maximization of the sale of 
assets on an integrated level, and provide guidance to complete insolvencies. 
Ultimately, such a policy would provide a workable solution to the inherent 
tension between respecting the bounds of legally separate entities, while 
 
 2 Samuel L. Bufford, Coordination of Insolvency Cases for International Enterprise Groups: A 
Proposal, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 685, 692 (2012). 
 3 See infra Part II.C. 
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achieving asset maximization at the corporate group level. Leaving creditors 
no worse off than in liquidation would be the guiding baseline for such a 
solution. 
In the absence of a single binding procedure, there are several means by 
which private parties can ensure efficient proceedings. This Article addresses 
the issues a practitioner will face in an E.U.-U.S. cross-border insolvency. Part 
I discusses the current state of international insolvency law: the United Nations 
Model Law, the European Union’s EIR, and the U.S.’s chapter 15. Part II 
addresses corporate groups—what they are, their benefits, and the challenges 
they face in insolvency. Determining a center of main interests (“COMI”) is 
frequently the greatest challenge. Part III then discusses the costs of a 
corporate group proceeding and how to maximize the proceedings’ efficiency. 
This Part also highlights case examples of corporate groups that achieved 
efficient proceedings and those that did not. Finally, Part IV provides 
guidelines for private parties to use protocols to coordinate efficient 
proceedings and how administrators can ensure efficiency. 
I. EXISTENT CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY LAW 
This Part will discuss the philosophical debate that has emerged around 
cross-border insolvencies. There are two dominant philosophies to cross-
border insolvency: universalism, which calls for a single proceeding and 
harmonized insolvency law; and territoriality, which advocates separate 
proceedings, with separate laws for each country in which the debtor has 
assets. In practice, a hybrid “modified universalism” prevails. Part I.B. 
explains how these philosophies have shaped the existent law. The United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s (“UNCITRAL”) Model 
Law espouses modified universalism. Part I.C. describes the U.S.’s version of 
the model law: chapter 15. While several European nations have also adopted 
versions of the model law, insolvencies between E.U. member states is 
governed by the European Insolvency Regulation (EIR), discussed in Part I.D. 
A. Philosophical Underpinnings 
The two diametrically opposed approaches to cross-border insolvencies are 
universalism and territorialism.4 Most international insolvency law operates 
 
 4 E.g., Kent Anderson, The Cross-Border Insolvency Paradigm: A Defense of the Modified Universal 
Approach Considering the Japanese Experience, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 679, 687–94 (2000); Lucian Arye 
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under the hybrid modified universalism, which aspires towards universalism, 
but maintains elements of territorialism. 
Universalism propounds a single unified law to govern bankruptcy 
proceedings.5 This would be a regime similar to the U.S. Code—federal law 
that controls in all U.S. states. Under universalism, all proceedings would take 
place in a centralized court and proceedings would be subject to a single law 
(with minor concessions to state law).6 Territorialism imposes no single law 
but relies on each jurisdiction to apply its own laws. It subjects a multinational 
debtor to parallel proceedings in each country in which its assets are located, 
but each country’s court’s jurisdiction does not extend beyond the country’s 
borders.7 Territorialism proponents argue that a formal universalist law 
infringes upon national sovereignty, and private parties can enter into private 
agreements, or protocols,8 to achieve efficiency without imposing a universal 
law on sovereign states.9 Absent a universal policy, the chances of parallel 
proceedings increase; multiple hearings add the costs of court-to-court 
coordination and the risks of local jurisdictions creating self-protective law or 
bias jurists.10 Intuitively, fewer competing proceedings are more efficient. 
Nonetheless, universalism’s ideal of a single proceeding is difficult to 
implement: countries and their citizen creditors are hesitant to cede their 
sovereignty. 
 
Bebchuck & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 775 
(1999); Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (1997); 
Donald T. Trautman et al., Four Models for International Bankruptcy, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 573 (1993); Philipp 
Wagner, Insolvency and Arbitration: A Pleading for International Insolvency Law, 5 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 189 
(2011); Liza Perkins, Note, A Defense of Pure Universalism in Cross-Border Corporate Insolvencies, 32 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 787 (2000). 
 5 Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177, 
2179; (2000); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276, 
2292–98 (2000).  
 6 For example, state laws have a greater impact on how personal insolvencies are resolved (homestead 
exemptions and mortgage laws). Contract and tort law will vary by U.S. state and affect chapter 11 
proceedings. 
 7 See Samuel L. Bufford, Global Venue Controls Are Coming: A Reply to Professor LoPucki, 79 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 105, 108 (2005). 
 8 See infra Part IV.B. (discussing the benefits of protocols, how they are used, and guidelines for 
developing protocols).  
 9 Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 696, 2219 (1999); see also John J. Chung, The New Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code: A 
Step toward Erosion of National Sovereignty, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 89 (2006); Edward J. Janger, Virtual 
Territoriality, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 401, 407 (2010) (citing Federal Mogul as an example of a case 
where territorial rules—the priority in of creditors—were ignored).  
 10 Evelyn H. Biery et al., A Look at Transnational Insolvencies and Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 47 B.C. L. REV. 23, 31–32 (2005). 
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The existent practice of cross-border insolvency is neither of these 
absolutes, but is a “modified universalism.”11 Modified universalism embraces 
the economic efficiency of single proceedings without a single universal 
bankruptcy law.12 It strikes a compromise between the two by allowing 
secondary proceedings13 and emphasizes cross-border cooperation, with 
cooperating countries maintaining their own laws.14 
B. The Model Law 
UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Insolvency15 has influenced cross-border 
cooperation and created a uniform adoption of modified universalism.16 Under 
the Model Law, adopting countries decide their own substantive law, but must 
allow foreign representatives “equal, simple, and fast access” to their law.17 
The Model Law provides a tool for “authorizing and encouraging cooperation 
and coordination between jurisdictions.”18 Its four key elements are access, 
recognition, relief (assistance), and cooperation.19 
 
 11 Leif M. Clark & Karen Goldstein, Sacred Cows: How to Care for Secured Creditors’ Rights in Cross-
Border Bankruptcies, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 513, 518–22 (2011). See generally Westbrook, supra note 5 
(describing modified universalism as a solution and critiquing other alternatives). 
 12 Jamie Altman, A Test Case in International Bankruptcy Protocols: The Lehman Brothers Insolvency, 
in 2011 NORTON ANN. REV. INTL. INSOLVENCY 11. 
 13 See infra text accompanying notes 47–52 (explaining secondary proceedings). 
 14 Altman, supra note 12.  
 15 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment, 
U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 (1997). 
 16 Matthew T. Cronin, Comment, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: Procedural 
Approach to a Substantive Problem, 24 J. CORP. L. 709, 710 (1999). The Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency was adopted by the U.N. in 1997. Legislation based on the Model Law has been adopted twenty 
countries to date—Eritrea (1998), Mexico (2000), South Africa (2000), Japan (2000), Montenegro (2002), 
Romania (2003), Poland (2003), Serbia (2004), the British Virgin Islands (2005), Ireland (2005), the United 
States of America (2005), Great Britain (2006), New Zealand (2006), and Colombia (2006), Republic of Korea 
(2006), Australia (2008), Mauritius (2009), Greece (2010), Uganda (2011). Status, 1997—UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html (last visited May 20, 2013).  
 17 Jenny Clift, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency—A Legislative Framework to 
Facilitate Coordination and Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvency, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 307 (2004). 
 18 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: The Judicial Perspective 
(Feb. 2012), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/V1188129-Judicial_Perspective_ebook-E.pdf. 
 19 Id. For more resources on the Model Law, see Clift, supra note 17; Allan L. Gropper, The Model Law 
After Five Years: The U.S. Experience with COMI, in 2011 NORTON ANN. REV. INTL. INSOLVENCY 13; 
Anthony Sexton, Current Problems and Trends in the Administration of Transnational Insolvencies Involving 
Enterprise Groups: The Mixed Record of Protocols, The UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law, and the EU 
Insolvency Regulation, 12 CHI. J. INT’L 811 (2012). 
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Comity is integral to the Model Law.20 Under the Model Law, the principle 
of comity has evolved into “recognition.”21 Once a court recognizes a foreign 
main proceeding, the recognizing court should use its equitable discretion to 
fashion post-recognition relief, equivalent to what that foreign court would 
anticipate under its own laws.22 According to one study, out of 195 cases, 
recognition was granted in 95% of all cases under the Model Law.23 
C. U.S. Law: Chapter 1524 
In 2005, the U.S. adopted the Model Law in chapter 15. Its encourages 
cooperation for transnational cases and provides for fair and efficient 
administration of cases.25 Like the Model Law, it prescribes recognition of 
foreign proceedings but limits recognition if actions would violate the 
recognizing country’s public policy. 
Chapter 15 was an extension of former 11 U.S.C. § 304,26 which permitted 
foreign representatives to appear in U.S. court without submitting to that 
court’s jurisdiction.27 U.S. courts have recognized that absent recognition of 
foreign proceedings, equitable and orderly distribution of assets would not be 
possible.28 One court explained chapter 15’s emphasis on cooperation: 
United States courts, trustees, examiners, debtors and debtors in 
possession and the courts and other competent authorities of foreign 
countries; greater legal certainty for trade and investment; fair and 
efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies that protects the 
 
 20 Comity is the mutual recognition of acts of other political entities. It “is neither a matter of absolute 
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which 
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due 
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who 
are under the protection of its laws.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2009) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 
113, 163–64 (1895) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 21 See In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., 374 B.R. 122, 126–
32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2007), aff’d 389 B.R. 325 (S.D.N.Y 2008).  
 22 See In re Atlas Shipping A/S, 404 B.R. 726, 738–46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
 23 Irit Mevorach, On the Road to Universalism: A Comparative and Empirical Study of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 520, 533 (2011) (noting that of the 195 
cases, only in 9 did the court not approve recognition).  
 24 11 U.S.C §§ 1501–1532 (2006). 
 25 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31 at 105 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 169; see also In re Basis 
Yield Alpha Fund (Master), 381 B.R. 37, 44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 26 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2002) (repealed 2005).  
 27 See Biery, supra note 10, at 31–32 (discussing the evolution of precedent under § 304 and the 
ramifications of chapter 15). Courts have relied on pre-chapter 15 precedents to adjudge cases, particularly 
when it comes to recognition and comity. 
 28 Vitrix S.S. Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709, 713–14 (2d Cir. 1987).  
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interests of all creditors and other interested entities, including the 
debtor; the protection and maximization of the debtor’s assets; and 
the facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses.29 
A foreign court or representative recognized by a U.S. court may also inure the 
benefits of other U.S. Code provisions.30 A representative may also ask the 
court for relief beyond what is already provided in the Code.31 
Comity has a rarely invoked exception32 to ensure it “does not prejudice the 
rights of United States citizens or violate domestic public policy.”33 Chapter 
15, as well as other Model Law adoptions, except otherwise mandatory 
recognition for actions “manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United 
States.”34 
In the U.S., all bankruptcy courts operate under chapter 15 for dealing with 
foreign debtors and proceedings. Within the E.U., the EIR guides the 
interactions of insolvencies between the E.U. member states. 
D. The European Insolvency Regulation (EIR)35 
While the EIR favors a universalist approach, it allows for the opening of 
secondary proceeding in addition to the main proceeding. This Subpart 
describes provisions of the EIR which protect creditors’ property rights and 
expectations, and why secondary proceedings are sometimes necessary to 
protect those rights. It then discusses proposed reforms to the EIR. 
The EIR came into effect in 2002.36 Its goals were to enable cross-border 
proceeding to operate efficiently, provide measures for coordinating the 
 
 29 In re Basis Yield Alpha, 381 B.R. at 44. 
 30 11 U.S.C. § 1520 (2006) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363, 549, 552).  
 31 United States v. J.A. Jones Const. Grp., LLC, 333 B.R. 637, 638 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1521); In re AJW Offshore, Ltd., Nos. 13-70078-ast, 13-70082-ast, 13-70085-ast, 13-70087-ast, 2013 WL 
1147203 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y Mar. 19, 2013) (explaining that a foreign representative in the Cayman Islands 
could get the turnover of debtor records, as long as adverse parties had an opportunity for hearing). 
 32 Megan R. O’Flynn, Comment, The Scorecard So Far: Emerging Issues in Cross-Border Insolvencies 
Under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 32 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 391, 413 (2012) (citing two rare 
examples: In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. 357 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 2009)). 
 33 Vitrix S.S., 825 F.2d at 713 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895)). 
 34 11 U.S.C. § 1504 (2006). In the EIR, the public policy exception is Article 26. Council Regulation 
1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC), at art. 26 [hereinafter EIR]. 
 35 EIR, supra note 34.  
 36 See generally BOB WESSELS, EUROPEAN UNION REGULATION OF INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: AN 
INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2003). 
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handling of debtors’ assets, and to avoid forum shopping.37 It applies only 
when the debtor has operations in two or more E.U. member States, but does 
not apply to non-E.U. countries.38 
Once the main proceeding is opened in the debtor’s “home country,” all 
other countries where the debtor has assets are subject to the laws of the main 
proceeding country.39 Other E.U. countries must recognize the main 
proceedings, and the main proceeding’s local laws dictate the liquidator’s 
powers.40 Article 16(1) mandates recognition of other E.U. member states.41 
Important to the integrity of a universalist regime is a respect for local 
property rights. Article 5 guarantees creditors that their rights in rem will not 
be vitiated by another country’s laws;42 it is an exception to the general rule 
that the main proceeding’s country’s laws operate.43 Any creditor has the legal 
right to open “secondary proceedings” in the country of the assets to pursue its 
rights in rem.44 Balancing property rights and efficiency drive varying 
interpretations of when creditors should be allowed to open secondary 
proceedings.45 Limiting secondary proceedings to only when a creditor’s rights 
would be diminished without them would be most efficient. This interpretation 
ensures creditors do not receive unfair discriminatory treatment.46 
 
 37 Bob Wessels, EU Insolvency and Its Impact on European Business, CESIFO DICE REPORT, Jan. 2006, 
at 16, 17, available at http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1193244.pdf. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Samuel L. Bufford, International Insolvency Case Venue in the European Union: The Parmalat and 
Daisytek Controversies, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 429, 434 (2006). 
 40 Id. 
 41 EIR, supra note 34, at art. 16(1) (“Any judgment opening insolvency proceedings handed down by a 
court of a Member State which has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 3 shall be recognised in all the other 
Member States from the time that it becomes effective in the State of the opening of proceedings.”). 
 42 Id. at art. 5.  
 43 INSOL EUROPE, REVISION OF THE EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY REGULATION: PROPOSALS 51 (May 2012).  
 44 The four possible interpretations for opening secondary proceedings are:  
(1) the national law where the assets are physically located (“lex rei sitae”) set a floor for the 
rights, but the rights shall also not be greater than in the lex rei sitae; (2) the rights via the lex rei 
sitae will be unaffected by the main proceedings; (3) the rights are only limited by the lesser of 
the two limitations (and may profit from the difference); or (4) a “hard and fast rule,” which 
allows opening proceedings for any alleged vitiation of rights.  
Id. at 51–52. 
 45 Id. at 53. 
 46 Unfair and discriminatory treatment is a driving principle in confirmation of chapter 11 plans. See 11 
U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(iv) (2006).  
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Article 27 governs secondary proceedings,47 sometimes known as ancillary 
proceedings.48 The EIR mandates that the liquidators of secondary proceedings 
cooperate closely with other liquidators.49 Despite this mandate, the main 
liquidator may not learn of the initiation of a secondary proceeding early 
enough to request a stay for a proceeding that may interfere with the most 
efficient resolution to the insolvency.50 The EIR limits secondary proceedings 
to winding up proceedings, thereby favoring liquidation over group 
reorganization.51 As an alternative to secondary proceedings, some 
commentators have suggested the main proceedings execute “synthetic 
proceedings,” in which the main court would operate under the law of a 
foreign member state to replicate the outcome of a secondary proceeding, 
without opening another proceeding in another court.52 
Recently, one court issued a formalistic reading of the EIR.53 The court 
read the EIR’s purpose as coordinating efficient proceedings.54 This reading 
suggests that secondary proceedings are the only proceedings other than the 
main proceedings that may be opened.55 The decision explained that when 
secondary proceedings are opened, the main proceedings must serve to protect 
debtor’s entire asset pool.56 
1. E.U. Recommended Reforms 
In 2011, the European Parliament called for a revision of the EIR.57 In 
2012, a Working Group made recommendations to improve the law by 
including a chapter devoted to corporate groups. These recommendations 
included requiring the court to hear the administrator of the main proceedings 
 
 47 EIR, supra note 34, at art. 27. 
 48 See Jose M. Garrido, No Two Snowflakes the Same: The Distributional Question in International 
Bankruptcies, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 459, 473 (2011). 
 49 Michel Menjucq & Reinhard Dammann, Regulation No 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings: Facing 
the Companies Group Phenomenon, 9 BUS. L. INT’L 145, 148 (2008). 
 50 EIR, supra note 34, at art. 33. 
 51 Id. at art. 27. 
 52 See, e.g., John A. E. Pottow, A New Role for Secondary Proceedings in International Bankruptcies, 20 
J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 5, Art. 1 (2011).  
 53 Bank Handlowy v. Warszawie SA C-116/11 [Judgment of the Court of the (First Chamber)] Nov. 22, 
2012 (Pol.). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See Harmonisation of Insolvency Law at EU Level, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 419.633 (2010).  
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prior to opening any secondary proceedings. This would enable a court to 
postpone (or eliminate altogether) the need for secondary proceedings. 
Prior to the issuance of the Working Group’s recommendations, the E.U. 
commissioned a study to elicit responses from insolvency participants in E.U. 
member states.58 Respondents reported that despite guidance encouraging 
cooperation, there was a lack of cooperation and communication between 
courts.59 Given the amount of money and information that moves across 
borders, it is essential to coordinate the sharing of information and 
cooperation.60 A specific EIR provision to govern coordination for corporate 
groups, including those groups that have non-E.U. entities, would mitigate 
these concerns. 
II. CORPORATE GROUPS 
A corporate group is a number of companies consisting of parent and 
subsidiary companies.61 However, neither the EIR nor chapter 15 define a 
corporate group or stipulate an insolvency process for a corporate group’s 
multiple entities.62 While the U.S. Code permits group reorganizations through 
a single insolvency venue,63 the EIR’s strong theory of separateness prevents it 
from being as effective in consolidating group proceedings.64 
This Part addresses why corporate groups are so prevalent and the unique 
problems they pose in insolvency. One of the key benefits of groups—
flexibility, also makes standardized rules for groups difficult to define with 
 
 58 Commission Staff Working Document Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment accompanying the 
document Revision of Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, COM (2012) 742 final (Dec. 
12, 2012) [hereinafter EC Impact Assessment]. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Leah Barteld, Cross-Border Bankruptcy and the Cooperative Solution, 9 B.Y.U. INT’L L. & MGMT. 
REV. 27, 43 (2012) (quoting Quentin Peel, Keynote at International Bar Association 2009 Annual Conference 
(Oct. 4, 2009)). 
 61 INSOL EUROPE, supra note 43, at 30 (EIR Proposed Article 2(j): “a number of companies consisting of 
parent and subsidiary companies”). But see Irit Mevorach, INSOL Europe’s Proposals on Groups of 
Companies (in Cross-Border Insolvency): A Critical Appraisal, 21 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 183, 188–89 
(2012). 
 62 Gabriel Moss, Proposal for Group COMI and its Consequences at the Tenth Annual International 
Insolvency Conference (June 7–8, 2010) (available at http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/ 
39/3890.html).  
 63 28 U.S.C. § 1408(2) (2006). 
 64 See Mevorach, supra note 61, at 194 & n.41.  
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universal agreement.65 Part II.B. addresses the foremost problem for any 
corporate group insolvency: determining its COMI. The E.U. has a place of 
registration rebuttable presumption and the U.S. had a main office test. Any 
approach should provide predictability to creditors, and clarify COMI early in 
the proceedings. Part II.C. explains how, once a COMI is established, 
proceedings could be made more efficient through consolidation. There are 
two forms of consolidation: procedural consolidation resolves the issues of all 
the group’s entities in one proceeding; substantive consolidation shatters the 
legal barriers between the entities and treats them as one. Procedural 
consolidation is more commonly employed, while substantive consolidation is 
rarer and more maligned. 
A. The Benefits of Corporate Groups 
The term “enterprise group” covers an array of economic organizations 
with two or more distinct legal entities linked through either an indirect or 
direct form of control or ownership.66 This Subpart discusses the different 
forms corporate groups take and how legal systems treat these forms. 
Structural flexibility benefits the corporate group by allowing for the allocation 
of risk and reduction of the cost of capital through the leverage effect. All sorts 
of group structures can benefit from a centralized, more efficient insolvency 
proceeding.67 However, centralized proceedings conflict with most legal 
systems’ emphasis on respecting the separateness of legal entities. While some 
non-legal mechanisms, such as contractualism,68 may lead to efficient 
outcomes, the status quo of corporate group insolvencies is done on a case-by-
case basis,69 providing little confidence in an efficient result. 
Corporate group’s structural dynamism makes it difficult to pre-determine 
third-party expectations about the corporate group’s structure. Corporate 
 
 65 UNCITRAL explains that the term “enterprise group” covers various forms of economic organizations 
that are treated as a single entity but composed of two or more legal entities linked together by direct or 
indirect ownership. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: Legislative 
Guide on Insolvency Law, U.N. Sales No. E.12.V.16, at 85–86 (July 2012), available at http://www.uncitral. 
org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Leg-Guide-Insol-Part3-ebook-E.pdf [hereinafter Legislative Guide]; see also 
Bufford, supra note 2, at 688 n.16 (providing several different definitions). 
 66 Legislative Guide, supra note 65, at 5. 
 67 Centralization is not always sought, even if it may be beneficial. Mevorach, supra note 23, at 542. 
Even with a universalist approach, there may sometimes still be subsequent appeals and litigation. Id. at 547. 
 68 See e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 2252 (2000). 
 69 Several European jurisdictions, such as the UK, Germany, France, Italy, and Hungary have found 
partial case-law solutions to group insolvencies. Moss, supra note 62. 
WOUTERSRAYKIN GALLEYS2 6/27/2013 1:34 PM 
398 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29 
groups may be decentralized or centralized. Subsidiaries in foreign countries 
may operate independently of its parent and have little connection to it aside 
from legal arrangements.70 A subsidiary may appear to the public as an 
independent company, and the size and complexity of the group is 
unapparent.71 Contrarily, the public image of the corporate group may be that 
of a unitary organization operating under a single corporate identity, despite 
having separate legal entities in each country.72 An entity in the group may 
enter into contracts independently, on behalf of another, or through 
intercompany and transfer pricing agreements.73 
There are many economic and legal benefits to allowing the corporate 
group to structure in a way that makes most sense for it.74 Most legal systems 
emphasize respect for corporate entity separateness. While some countries, 
such as Germany, have adopted specific legal regimes for corporate groups, 
attempts to do so at the E.U. level have failed.75 The law is reluctant to ignore 
its reverence for legal separateness; however, balancing this reverence with the 
goals of insolvency creates difficulties.76 
Risk allocation and the structural flexibility can mitigate the likelihood of 
corporate group insolvency. Individual subsidiaries of a group usually will not 
file for bankruptcy unless the parent’s health requires it.77 Aggregation of 
companies into a large unit creates a “leverage effect,” which reduces the cost 
of capital, because companies supported and backed by others are less likely to 
file bankruptcy.78 Independent subsidiaries allow for an apportioning of risk 
where each legal entity has an easily ascertainable level of risk, independent 
from another one, which may be more attractive to different creditors.79 
 
 70 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 
387, 437 (2000). 
 71 IRIT MEVORACH, INSOLVENCY WITHIN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE GROUPS 154–55 (2009). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 70, at 437. 
 75 MEVORACH, supra note 71, at 52–56.  
 76 Robert K. Rasmussen, Where Are All the Transnational Bankruptcies? The Puzzling Case for 
Universalism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 983, 994 (2007). (citing John Armour & Simon Deakin, Norms in Private 
Insolvency: The “London Approach” to the Resolution of Financial Distress, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 21 (2001)). 
 77 Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. & Joseph H. Sommer, Breaking Up is Hard to Do: An Essay on Cross-Border 
Challenges in Resolving Financial Groups, in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: RESOLVING LARGE BANK 
INSOLVENCIES (Douglas D. Evanoff & George G. Kaufman, eds. 2005). 
 78 Nico Dewaelheyns & Cynthia Van Hulle, Corporate Failure Prediction Modeling, 33 J. BUS. & ACC. 
909, 912-915 (June–July 2006) (discussing liquidity, size, and efficiency as influential factors).  
 79 Alexander Dåhnert, The Threat of Corporate Groups and the Insolvency Connection, 18 INSOL INT’L 
INSOLVENCY REV. 209 (2009) (discussing the reasoning behind groups and strategies considered); Nico 
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However, systemic failure can lead to corporate group failure.80 In Europe, 
the vast majority of cases filed under the EIR are corporate groups.81 In the 
U.S., the majority of chapter 15 cases also involved corporate groups.82 Three 
key features that distinguish the corporate group insolvency from a standard 
individual insolvency are: (1) each entity in the group has its own legal status, 
shareholders, creditors, and assets; (2) each entity may have a unique COMI; 
and (3) coordination between the entities is difficult.83 
All types of groups may benefit from centralized proceedings.84 Often, 
“cooperation may be the only way to reduce the risk of piecemeal insolvency 
proceedings that have the potential to destroy going concern value and lead to 
asset ring-fencing, as well as asset shifting or forum shopping by debtors.”85 If 
there are multiple proceedings for legally distinct entities, the debtors may 
have to rely on the corporate group identity to get recognition for another 
proceeding.86 Being able to reorganize as a full entity, rather than piecemeal, 
can also permit the group to continue as a going concern and inure the benefits 
of the leverage effect. 
Flexibility in the corporate structure has important ex ante benefits, but can 
continue to have benefits as to how the enterprise restructures ex post through 
private ordering. One example of private ordering is the “London Approach” 
(or ad hoc contractualism).87 This entails getting standstill agreements pre-
insolvency from creditors to guarantee no secondary proceedings.88 Though 
 
Dewaelheyns & Cynthia Van Hulle, Internal Capital Markets and Capital Structure: Bank Versus Internal 
Debt (2007), available at http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/eng/tew/academic/afi/pdfs/afi_0703.pdf. 
 80 Cf. Alexandra CC Ragan, Comment, Comi Strikes A Discordant Note: Why U.S. Courts Are Not in 
Complete Harmony Despite Chapter 15 Directives, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 117, 168 (2010). 
 81 Irit Merovach, The Road to a Suitable and Comprehensive Global Approach to Insolvencies Within 
Multinational Corporate Groups, 15 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 5 ART. 1 (2006).  
 82 A 2010 study found of 383 cases filed, 232 involved enterprise groups. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The 
Model Law and the United States: COMI and Groups at the Tenth Annual International Insolvency Conference 
(June 7–8, 2010) (available at http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/362/4114.html).  
 83 Bufford, supra note 2, at 690. 
 84 Eberhard Neitzer, Guidelines for Coordination of Multinational Enterprise Group Insolvencies, 4 
INT’L INSOLVENCY L. REV. 491, 499 (2012) 
 85 Legislative Guide, supra note 65, at 41–42. 
 86 Id. at 42. 
 87 Rasmussen, supra note 76, at 997 (citing Armour & Deakin, supra note 76). Several sources urge 
private cooperation outside of court. E.g., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: COOPERATION AMONG THE NAFTA 
COUNTRIES (A.L.I. 2003); Bob Wessels & Miguel Virgós, European Communication and Cooperation 
Guidelines for Cross-border Insolvency (July 2007), available at http://www.insol.org/INSOLfaculty/pdfs/ 
BasicReading/Session%205/European%20Communication%20and%20Cooperation%20Guidelines%20for%2
0Cross-border%20Insolvency%20.pdf. 
 88 Rasmussen, supra note 76, at 997.  
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private ordering has its benefits, the London Approach presumes that 
management will foresee financial difficulties early enough to seek the 
agreements and secure the cooperation of the creditors. 
While many group insolvencies have had positive outcomes, limited 
predictability has resulted in a case-by-case approach that is “haphazard.”89 
Opening of separate proceedings with independent administrators leads to the 
disintegration of the business and ultimately a decrease in the returns to the 
creditors.90 Determining an appropriate home for group main proceedings is 
essential to preventing disintegrated main proceedings. 
B. Center of Main Interests (COMI) 
Where is the “right” place to complete the group insolvency proceedings?91 
The E.U. and the U.S. have different approaches to COMI. In most instances 
the outcome will be the same, but there can be some variance. Both approaches 
are concerned with predictability to creditors, but the E.U. focuses on formal 
registration, whereas the U.S. focuses on the head office test. There is no 
concept such as a corporate group COMI; each legal entity may have its own 
COMI.92 It is probably too difficult to set up an unflagging rule for 
determining COMI.93 Flexibility granted to corporation groups also requires 
courts be reciprocally flexible for proceedings.94 Nonetheless, predictability is 
a key tenet for effective insolvency policy. 
A COMI is integral to a single (universalist) proceeding.95 It is the venue 
for proceeding, and triggers the venue’s applicable law for the proceedings. A 
COMI is perpetual for the insolvency and at any given time, a company can 
 
 89 Irit Mevorach, Towards A Consensus on the Treatment of Multinational Enterprise Groups in 
Insolvency, 18 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 359, 366 (2010) (explaining a lack of explicit rules leads to the 
haphazard approach). 
 90 See Ian Fletcher, The European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, in INSOL 
INTERNATIONAL, CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: A GUIDE TO RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT 15, 20 (2003). 
 91 See, e.g., Mevorach, supra note 89, at 388–98; Irit Mevorach, The “Home Country” of a Multinational 
Enterprise Group Facing Insolvency, in 2009 NORTON ANN. REV. INTL. INSOLVENCY 5; Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1019 (2007). 
 92 Janis Sarra, Oversight and Financing of Cross-Border Business Enterprise Group Insolvency 
Proceedings, 44 TEX. INT’L L.J. 547, 562 (2009). 
 93 See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Treatment of Corporate 
Groups in Insolvency, ¶¶ 39–47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.74 (Oct. 4, 2006). 
 94 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Report of Working Group V 
(Insolvency Law) on the Work of Its Thirty-Fifth Session, ¶¶ 28–29 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/666 (Dec. 2, 2008). 
 95 Mevorach, supra note 89, at, 397 (citing the EIR, the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the ALI 
Principles).  
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only have one COMI.96 Corporate groups may not have an easily ascertainable 
home or may have many homes each with an equal proportion of the group’s 
operations.97 The E.U.’s research has shown that COMI issues arose in 40–
50% of all insolvency cases, though COMI was not always contested.98 
In the most efficient procedure, the beginning of a case should look to 
determine an enterprise-wide COMI. There need not be a rigid COMI rule, but 
a set of criteria to determine COMI is in the right forum early in the 
proceedings. Then, creditors can level their expectations and be aware that 
secondary proceedings are not permissible unless there is a credible threat that 
their Article 5 rights would not be protected. 
1. E.U. Approach 
EIR Article 3 dictates that the COMI is the place of registration, but this is 
a rebuttable presumption.99 The 2006 Eurofood decision explained that this 
presumption is very strong, rebuttable only by a clear set of factors that 
cumulatively indicate to third parties a different COMI.100 Eurofood reduced 
the scope for procedural consolidation of separate legal entities.101 Some 
 
 96 Adam Gallagher, Center of Main Interest: The EU Insolvency Regulation and Chapter 15, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., July–Aug. 2009, at 44, 79. 
 97 LoPucki, supra note 9, at 713–18 (1999). 
 98 EC Impact Assessment, supra note 58, at 5. INSOL recommends the following definition for COMI:  
the place of the registered office, except that, (i) where the operational head office functions of 
the company or legal person are carried out in another Member State and that other Member 
State is ascertainable to actual and prospective creditors as the place where such operational head 
office functions are carried out, it shall mean and refer to the Member State where such 
operational head functions are carried out and (ii) where the company or legal person is a mere 
holding company or mere holding legal person, within a group with head office functions in 
another Member State, the centre of main interests as defined in the previous sentence is located 
in such other Member State. The mere fact that the economic choices and decisions of a company 
are or can be controlled by a parent company in another Member State than the Member State of 
the registered office does not cause the centre of main interests to be located in this other 
Member State. In the case of individuals, the centre of main interests shall mean the place of 
habitual residence, except that in case of professionals it shall be the professional’s principal 
office or principal location from which his profession is conducted. 
INSOL EUROPE, supra note 61, at 9. 
 99 “For a company or legal person, the place of its registered office shall be presumed to be the centre of 
its main interests, in the absence of proof of the contrary.” EIR, supra note 34, at art. 3. 
 100 Menjucq & Reinhard Dammann, supra note 49, at 148. 
 101 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic 
and Social Committee, on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on 
Insolvency Proceedings, at 15 COM (2012) 743 final (Dec. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Insolvency Report]. 
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nations may take a stricter view of this presumption.102 Interdil tempered the 
harshness of Eurofood, to allow COMI based on the parent company’s 
location, but only if the parent company’s COMI was objectively observable 
by the subsidiary’s creditors.103 There are no concrete rules for determining 
what the ascertainable facts to myriad creditors will be.104 Corporate groups 
may also strategically migrate their COMI for more advantageous insolvency 
law.105 There is no data to demonstrate whether creditors, particularly of the 
largest corporate groups, are truly confused as to with which member of the 
group they are dealing.106 Thus, it is difficult to predict when the strong 
presumption may be rebutted.107 
The EIR does not include an express duty for a court to investigate whether 
it has proper jurisdiction before initiating a main proceeding.108 This is 
problematic because it gives too much leverage to a corporate group to choose 
its COMI, but also incentivizes the opening of secondary proceedings when the 
main proceedings began in a sub-optimal jurisdiction for the group. Because 
secondary proceedings are limited to winding up proceedings,109 this 
minimizes the effectiveness of reorganizations. This may happen because of a 
lack of communication and no centralized information repository for 
insolvency proceedings in other E.U. member states.110 
 
 102 E.g., INSOL INT’L, CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY II: A GUIDE TO RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT 
34–35 (2012). 
 103 Id.  
 104 See Gabriel Moss & Michael Haravon, “Building Europe”—the French Case Law on COMI, 20 
INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 20, 22 (2007) (explaining that courts in the United Kingdom, Germany, Hungary, 
Italy and France have adopted the “head office functions” as a guide).  
 105 E.g., In re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA [2009] EWHC 3199 (Ch) (the 
Luxembourg-based Wind Hellas Telecoms re-registered in England three months before opening insolvency 
proceedings).  
 106 Westbrook, supra note 91, at 1036. 
 107 See Ragan, supra note 80, at 133. 
 108 EC Impact Assessment, supra note 58, at 5 (discussing that there is no such requirement in the EIR). 
However, some courts do dismiss cases for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Teresa Camacho & Alberto Nunez-
Lagos Burguera, Secondary Proceedings: Are Cross-Border Insolvencies in the EU Dealt with Efficiently?, 2 
INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 140, 145 & n. 10 (2013) (citing Judgment issued by the Commercial Court No. 1 of 
Bilbao on 13 Dec. 2011, auto 528/2011).  
 109 See supra text accompanying notes 48–52. 
 110 See Camacho & Burguera, supra note 108, at 143–44. 
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2. U.S. Approach 
In contrast to the EIR, the U.S. Code says a court must determine the 
COMI upon the commencement of proceedings.111 Recently, a court clarified 
commencement is different from recognition, even if the COMI may have 
changed in the interim.112 For a proceeding to be recognized, it must be 
classified as either a foreign main (those in the debtor’s COMI) or non-main 
proceeding.113 
The U.S. approach to determining the COMI is a “command and control 
test.”114 In re Bear Stearns noted the presumption of registration is helpful 
when there is no serious controversy, but listed a number of alternate factors to 
determine the COMI: 
the location of the debtor’s headquarters; the location of those who 
actually manage the debtor (which, conceivably could be the 
headquarters of a holding company); the location of the debtor’s 
primary assets; the location of the majority of the debtor’s creditors 
or of a majority of the creditors who would be affected by the case; 
and/or the jurisdiction whose law would apply to most disputes.115 
The District Court’s affirmed the bankruptcy court and favorably quoted these 
factors.116 
Prior to chapter 15, the concept of COMI was unknown in the U.S.,117 but 
it resembles the principle place of business test used in civil procedure, which 
 
 111 In re Betcorp Ltd., 400 B.R. 266, 291–92 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009). 
 112 In re Kemsley, No. 12-13570 JMP, 2013 WL 1164930 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y Mar. 22, 2013) (“It did not 
matter that, after these insolvency proceedings were commenced, the debtor’s wife moved with their children 
back to the UK and the debtor allegedly began to think of repatriating to be with his children, since the 
debtor’s COMI had to be determined as of the date the foreign proceedings commenced, not when recognition 
was sought.”). But see In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., No. 11-4376., 2013 WL 1593348 (2d Cir. Apr. 16, 2013) 
(“But given the EU Regulation and other international interpretations, which focus on the regularity and 
ascertainability of a debtor’s COMI, a court may consider the period between the commencement of the 
foreign insolvency proceeding and the filing of the Chapter 15 petition to ensure that a debtor has not 
manipulated its COMI in bad faith.”).  
 113 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4). 
 114 In re Betcorp, 400 B.R. at 290; In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master 
Fund, Ltd., 374 B.R. 122, 126–32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2007), aff’d 389 B.R. 325 (S.D.N.Y 2008); In re Sphinx, 
351 B.R. 103, 117–21(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); Gropper, supra note 19.  
 115 In re Bear Stearns 374 B.R. at 128 (citing In re Sphinx, 351 B.R. at 117). 
 116 Id. at 336 (citing additional cases which relied on these factors: In re Ernst & Young, Inc., 383 B.R. 
773, 779 (Bankr.D. Colo. 2008); In re Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master), 381 B.R. 37, 47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2008); In re Loy, 380 B.R. 154, 162 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007)). 
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looks at where the majority of the group’s operations take place.118 This test is 
not as rigid as the EIR’s rebuttable presumption, but it still emphasizes the 
predictability to third parties. 
3. A Combined Approach 
The E.U. approach of relying on registration and objective factors evident 
to creditors presents problems for determining a corporate group-wide COMI, 
particularly given the emphasis on respecting legal separateness. The head 
office approach would still be ascertainable for creditors.119 Several European 
courts followed this test for successful group proceedings.120 The more flexible 
approach also caters to a wider range of corporate group structures. There may 
be complex cases where court involvement is necessary to adjudge the COMI, 
but these cases would be the exception, not the rule. A determination that the 
chosen COMI is appropriate should be made early in the process. 
Despite the problem in determining E.U. corporate groups COMI and no 
mechanism by which to consolidate proceedings, several corporate groups 
have successfully had single proceedings in the home of the parent.121 
Examples include Daisytek and Nortel.122 
C. Procedural Consolidation 
Procedural consolidation is the consolidation of all proceedings into a 
single proceeding, to allow for a common claims procedure and prevent the 
disturbance of the group’s assets and debts.123 In the U.S., and in Canada, 
 
 117 See Mark Lightner, Determining the Center of Main Interests Under Chapter 15, 18 NORTON J. 
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 519, 521 (3d ed. 2009) (“Bankruptcy courts have struggled somewhat to define COMI, in 
part because COMI was not, before BAPCPA, part of American law.”). 
 118 See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2009) (defining a corporation’s principal place of business for 
determining diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(c)(1) as its “nerve center”); see also Bennett Truck 
Transp. LLC v. Tri-Continental Exch. Ltd. (In re Tri-Continental Exch. Ltd.), 349 B.R. 627 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 
2006) (explaining that the drafters chose COMI over the principal place of business for consistency with other 
countries’ terminology). 
 119 See Mevorach, supra note 89, at 403. 
 120 Gabriel Moss & Tom Smith, Commentary on Council Regulation 1346/ 2000 on Insolvency 
Proceedings, in THE EC REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS—A COMMENTARY AND ANNOTATED 
GUIDE, (Gabriel Moss et al., eds. 2009) (noting Eurotunnel, Collins & Aikman, Hettlage AG & CO KG, 
EMTEC).  
 121 Mevorach, supra note 61, at 194 (citing several examples). 
 122 Gallagher, supra note 96, at 79. 
 123 See Sarra, supra note 92, at 656; see also Christoph G. Paulus, Group Insolvencies—Some Thoughts 
About New Approaches, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 819, 826 (2007). 
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procedural consolidation is commonplace. Several other countries have 
provisions for it, but the EIR does not.124 Procedural consolidation allows a 
corporate group to have a common court filing, a single set of notices, a 
common administrator, and joint proceedings; however, the individual legal 
entities can retain their separate insolvency estates and create different 
reorganization plans.125 
In the E.U., the lack of an explicit procedural consolidation provision 
creates inefficient proceedings: the E.U. estimates that 700 companies with 
multi-national subsidiaries open hundreds of secondary proceedings.126 
Because U.S. law authorizes the commencement of a case in the same 
bankruptcy court for affiliated entities,127 secondary proceedings are rare.128 
U.S. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2009(a) allows for the election of a 
single trustee to preside over the joint process.129 Consolidation reduces 
transactional costs.130 
The EIR allows secondary proceedings only for winding up proceedings, 
and courts do not have to determine whether opening secondary proceedings is 
reasonable or advisable.131 Courts should consider efficient administration of 
the overall estate.132 Courts exercising discretion to determine best interests 
would minimize abusive proceedings.133 Additionally, the EIR could allow 
secondary proceedings for more than winding up procedures, to avoid 
compromising a group restructuring and forcing liquidation. 
Although proceedings in the U.S. may be consolidated into one proceeding, 
cross-border enforcement of those judgments is subject to recognition of the 
U.S. court’s findings. Recently, in Rubin Finance,134 the English Supreme 
 
 124 Heribert Hirte, Towards a Framework for the Regulation of Corporate Groups’ Insolvencies, 5 EURO. 
CO. & FIN. L. REV. 213, 218–19 (2008) (noting Germany, Hungary, France, and Spain have allowed corporate 
group procedural consolidations). 
 125 Bufford, supra note 2, at 737. 
 126 EC Impact Assessment, supra note 58, at 6. 
 127 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006).  
 128 Bufford, supra note 2, at 737. 
 129 MEVORACH, supra note 71 at 160. 
 130 Bufford, supra note 2, at 709–10; see also Rasmussen, supra note 76, at 989 (citing In re UAL Corp., 
No. 02-B-48191, 2006 WL 6593116 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jan 3, 2006) (28 petitions consolidated into one); In 
re Sea Containers Ltd., No. 06-11156, 2009 WL 2208128 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 15, 2006); In re Calpine, No. 
05-60200 (BRL), 2007 WL 685595, at *2-3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2007)). 
 131 Camacho & Burguera, supra note 108, at 144. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 147. 
 134 Rubin v Eurofinance S.A. [2012] UKSC 46. 
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Court refused to recognize the U.S. court judgment.135 The court rejected the 
argument that a universalist policy compelled enforcement, and instead noted 
there was no basis in English law to enforce the foreign law upon third parties 
(in this instance, an avoidance action).136 The court emphasized that the Model 
Law does not extend to enforcing judgments on third parties in personam.137 
The impact of this ruling is yet to be seen.138 The case leaves questions on how 
to handle a E.U.-U.S. insolvency proceedings: even if a debtor files a 
consolidated proceeding in the U.S., all parties involved may be weary of a 
series of appeals and the inability to get recognition of U.S. judgments in E.U. 
countries. Rubin Finance was a departure from precedent,139 and the dissent 
noted it deviated from modified universalism’s principles that had long guided 
English insolvency proceedings.140 Another case, Waste2Energy, issued just 
weeks before Rubin Finance, but with distinct facts,141 expresses that offshore 
jurisdictions are embracing universalism.142 These opinions creates some 
confusion for UK practitioners, but proposed amendments to the EIR may 
provide clarification between the two cases.143 
D. Substantive Consolidation 
While procedural consolidations are common in the U.S., a more 
controversial approach to dealing with corporate groups is substantive 
consolidation, which abolishes the barriers between legal entities and 
consolidates them into one entity. Dismantling the pre-established legal 
separateness may not offer a broad solution, but can be useful in limited 
circumstances. 
 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Paul Atherton, United Kingdom: UK Supreme Court Rules on Cross-Border Insolvencies, MONDAQ, 
Mar. 25, 2013, http://www.mondaq.com/x/224122/Insolvency+Bankruptcy/UK+Supreme+Court+Rules+On+ 
CrossBorder+Insolvencies. 
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 139 The decision overruled Cambridge Gas Transportation Corp. v Official Comm. of Unsecured 
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 140 Rubin v Eurofinance S.A. [2012] UKSC 46; New Cap Reinsurance Corp & Anor v Grant & Ors 
[2012] UKSC 46. 
 141 Interdevelco Limited v. Waste2Energy Group Holdings PLC, High Court of Justice of the Isle of Man, 
CHP 12/0056, Decision 10th Oct. 2012, available at www.judgments.im/content/j1185.htm. 
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AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2013, at 42, 118. 
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U.S. courts have consolidated entities on limited occasions.144 The term 
“substantive consolidation” does not appear anywhere in the U.S. Code, but 
courts have exercised their equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105, when they 
deem it necessary.145 In re Owens-Corning146 set the standard for substantive 
consolidation. It should be a rare tool used only when the legal separateness of 
the entities prepetition was a mere formality; because assets and liabilities were 
so intertwined, creditors recognized no borders between the entities and it 
would not benefit them to respect the separateness of the entities.147 
Substantive consolidation is often employed as a tool of partial integration, 
or “de facto substantive consolidation.”148 This may be practically applied 
when entities are legally distinct, but their finances are so intertwined that 
disentanglement proves impossible.149 Thus, “de facto” substantive 
consolidation could be a useful tool for corporate group insolvencies to 
minimize the number of proceedings without a broad rule razing entity 
separateness.150 
III.  COST EFFICIENCY & SINGLE PROCEEDINGS 
Insolvency’s goal of maximizing creditor wealth is best achieved by 
minimizing unnecessary transaction and ex post insolvency costs.151 A 
controlling policy for maintaining corporate group insolvencies would resolve 
the conflicts between separate legal entities and creditors in favor of the 
maximum benefit for all creditors. While such a result is not impossible under 
the current regime, it is not guaranteed.152 This Part explains the economic 
theory of why individual creditors sacrificing their purported rights would 
 
 144 Weitz & Wiener, supra note 142, at 42. 
 145 Eastgroup Props. v. S. Motel Ass’n, Ltd., 935 F.2d 245, 248 (11th Cir. 1991); accord First Nat’l Bank 
of El Dorado v. Giller (In re Giller), 962 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1992); Union Savings Bank v. Augie/Restivo 
Baking Co., Ltd. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd.), 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Vecco Constr. 
Indus., 4 B.R. 407 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980). 
 146 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005) (amended 2007). 
 147 Id. at 211.  
 148 Jacob Ziegel, Canada-United States Cross-Border Insolvency Relations and the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1041, 1050 (2007). 
 149 See id. 
 150 See infra Part III.D.3. (discussing General Growth Properties as an example of de facto substantive 
consolidation). 
 151 SAMUEL L. BUFFORD ET AL., UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW 2008–2009, 21–22 
(2009); MEVORACH, supra note 71, at 107. 
 152 See supra Part II.B.1. (citing examples of cases where a single COMI was achieved despite no law 
requiring it); infra Part III.B.1. (discussing examples of cases with good outcomes).  
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ultimately benefit them, other creditors, and the economy overall. It then goes 
on to discuss the impact of corporate groups’ size on the costs of the 
proceedings: the time it takes to wind up and the direct fees to professionals 
involved. This Part also highlights several group insolvencies, which provide 
insight on factors that determine insolvency proceedings’ efficiency or lack 
thereof. 
A. Economic Theories of Single Proceeding Efficiency 
A standardized policy for dealing with corporate groups would not only 
provide a framework to efficiently conclude proceedings, but stabilize ex ante 
capital markets by minimizing uncertainties in the event of future 
insolvencies.153 This Subpart discusses the harms of uncertainty absent a policy 
of efficient proceedings. The Collins & Aikman insolvency demonstrates how 
and why competing interests can coordinate to achieve an efficient outcome. 
The specter of feuding creditors opening numerous proceedings, 
prolonging proceedings, and diminishing overall value and return to creditors 
could be detracting for a potential creditor.154 Uncertainty can also have the 
negative market effects of decreasing ex ante credit, increasing the associated 
interest rates, and creating economic deadweight.155 It could deter “the free 
flow of capital among counties and creates a disincentive to investment across 
borders.”156 
Uncertainty diminishes incentives for cooperation between creditors. 
Absent a guarantee that other creditors will not attempt to open secondary 
proceedings, any creditor with a viable claim under Article 5157 faces an 
anticommons problem—if every creditor is grabbing for their own best 
interest, why would one creditor sacrifice its own interests for the corporate 
group’s collective good?158 However, when parties do not coordinate for a 
common goal,159 they each attain suboptimal results.160 One means to avoid 
 
 153 See David C. Webb, The Importance of Incomplete Information in Explaining the Existence of Costly 
Bankruptcy, 54 ECONOMICA 279, 279 (1987). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. 
FIN. ECON. 285, 285 (1990); Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 4, at 779–80. 
 156 Altman, supra note 12.  
 157 See supra Part I.D. 
 158 Mevorach, supra note 89, at 371. 
 159 BOB WESSELS, BRUCE A. MARKELL & JASON J. KILBORN, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN 
BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY MATTERS 167 (2009).  
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this problem are private protocols—private guarantees that the proceedings 
will follow the planned route.161 
While individual creditors may object to the idea of a single proceeding, 
efficient consolidation puts the interests of all the creditors above those of an 
individual creditor. Theoretically, an individual creditor’s abrogated rights 
under the local law would be mitigated by the overall increase in the enterprise 
asset maximization from a single proceeding in a different jurisdiction.162 The 
creditor would be in no worse a position than it would have been under local 
law. This is known as the “rough wash theory.”163 
The Collins & Aikman164 insolvency exemplifies an efficient global sale 
and the rough wash theory. Collins & Aikman was an automotive parts 
supplier.165 Twenty-four companies in nine E.U. states were consolidated into 
one centralized proceeding in England.166 Though the COMI could have been 
one of many places in Europe, the company filed in England, and once 
proceedings were initiated, the English-appointed joint administrators took 
quick action to contact creditors throughout the continent, and request they not 
open secondary proceedings.167 The administrators assured these creditors that 
the main proceeding in England would respect what their financial positions 
would have been, had the proceedings taken place under their local law.168 
Reviewing these assurances, the court considered the equitable nature of 
insolvency proceedings and found no reason why it could not abide by the 
administrators’ guarantees.169 
One of Collins & Aikman’s larger creditors was U.S. based J.P. Morgan. 
J.P. Morgan would have been benefited more under U.S. priority law than 
under English law. Nonetheless, J.P. Morgan submitted to the court a letter of 
 
 160 See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 578, 618 (2010). 
 161 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 162 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice 
of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J. 457, 464–66 (1991). 
 163 Id. 
 164 Re Collins & Aikman Europe SA, [2006] EWHC 1343 (Ch). 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. However, German law may sometimes require substantive consolidation, with a single 
administrative for the groups. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.  
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
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support for the proposed deal and agreed not to open secondary proceedings.170 
J.P. Morgan explained that foregoing any further actions and completing the 
sale on the administrators’ proposed terms would be a better deal for it in the 
end.171 Ultimately, Collins & Aikman liquidated for $45 million more than 
estimated.172 The case is haled as a model for how to complete single corporate 
group proceedings.173 
B. The Impact of a Debtor’s Size on Efficiency 
Economies of scale operate in insolvency proceedings. Larger enterprises 
will absorb costs because the fixed costs of insolvency will be the same 
regardless of the size of the debtor, but are less significant relative to the size 
of the entire debtor. Several studies have sought to prove that there is a 
correlation between the size of the debtor and a reduction in costs of 
bankruptcy.174 However, such studies acknowledge that insolvencies are 
complex, with too many variables to do a fair comparison.175 Furthermore, 
there are questions about how one defines the debtor’s size: assets, assets and 
liabilities, employees, or more qualitative factors.176 
Capitalizing on the size and leverage effect,177 a corporate group, if 
reorganized in a centralized manner, is more likely to continue as a going 
concern. In the U.S., the general policy is to favor reorganization because of its 
macroeconomic benefits. Despite the macroeconomic benefits, liquidation is 
 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 See, e.g., Gabriel Moss QC, Group Insolvency-Choice of Forum and Law: The European Experience 
Under the Influence of English Pragmatism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1005, 1018 (2007). Even this case, despite 
its overll efficiency, had one secondary proceeding open in Austria. Id. 
 174 E.g., Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, The Costs of Chapter 11 in Context: American and 
Dutch Business Bankruptcy, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63 (2011); Abe De Jong & Oscar Couwenberg, Costs and 
Recovery Rates in the Dutch Liquidation-Based Bankruptcy System, 26 EURO. J. L. ECON. 105–27 (2008) 
(finding that with a 1% increase in the size of a debtor, professional fees grow by less than 0.05%, all else 
equal); Dewaelheyns & Van Hulle, supra note 78, at 912–15; Nico Dewaelheyns & Cynthia Van Hulle, 
Filtering Speed in A Continental European Reorganization Procedure, 29 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 375, 383 
(2009). 
 175 See, e.g., Dewaelheyns & Van Hulle, Filtering Speed, supra note 174; De Jong & Couwenberg, supra 
note 174. 
 176 Stephen J. Lubben, What We “Know” About Chapter 11 Cost Is Wrong, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 141, 159–61 (2012). 
 177 See infra Part III.C. 
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generally cheaper from the creditor’s perspective.178 However, one study 
concluded that chapter 7 (liquidation) is no less costly than chapter 11 
(reorganization) proceedings, but the latter preserves assets better and 
creditors’ returns are far greater.179 With the cooperation of creditors in 
reorganizing, not only would the debtor and the economy benefit, so would the 
creditors themselves. 
Unlike the U.S.’s policy favoring reorganization, the EIR’s structure 
encourages liquidation. Article 27 says secondary proceedings may only be 
opened for liquidation proceedings, which makes restructuring challenging.180 
The challenge can be exacerbated by the uncertainty of whether secondary 
proceedings will be opened. Liquidating chunks of the group while trying to 
preserve a going concern may prove next to impossible. 181 
The preference for liquidations is beginning to be counteracted by the 
increasing use of coordinated insolvency proceedings across subsidiaries.182 
Forcing liquidation instead of reorganization sacrifices the benefits gained by 
forming corporate groups.183 
C. Speed & Costs of Proceedings 
The ability to go in and out of insolvency quickly will minimize both the 
direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy. While the complexities of corporate 
groups’ structures may complicate proceedings, the structures may allow for 
more rapid restructuring. Avoiding secondary proceedings will minimize the 
time and expense of having to cooperate between more parties and duplicate 
efforts. It will also limit the need to incur more professional fees (such as 
liquidators, attorneys, and accountants), who charge high rates for complex 
group matters. 
 
 178 Reorganizations involve tremendous costs. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate 
Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986); Kevin A. Kordana & Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of 
Chapter 11, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 161 (1999); Stephen J. Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: 
An Empirical Examination of Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 509 (2000); 
Stephen J. Lubben, Some Realism About Reorganization: Explaining the Failure of Chapter 11 Theory, 106 
DICK. L. REV. 267 (2001). 
 179 Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch, & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation versus Chapter 
11 Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253 (2006). 
 180 EIR, supra note 34, at art. 27.  
 181 This preference toward liquidation is being counteracted by the increasing use of coordinated activities 
across subsidiaries. EC Impact Assessment, supra note 58, at 8. 
 182 Id. at 4.  
 183 BOB WESSELS, INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW 15 (3d ed. 2012).  
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Based on the leverage effect and the flexibility of corporate groups,184 
corporate groups are more likely to structure a deal that is more attractive to 
prospective buyers or future creditors.185 Groups are sold faster than stand-
alone firms.186 Groups are more quickly able to find buyers for their troubled 
subsidiary than an individual company would be.187 However, correlation 
between speed of the proceedings and return to creditors depends on the firm’s 
financial condition.188 A firm in poorer health will more likely be pushed into 
liquidation regardless of whether this will yield the highest return.189 The 
length of the proceedings logically correlates with direct costs incurred. But 
even if length is not correlated to the direct costs, it has an effect on ex post 
costs (such as goodwill and managerial behavior).190 
Resolving the insolvency through a single proceeding would expedite the 
proceedings and help save on costs. Parallel proceedings are likely to trigger 
inter-creditor disputes on points of law and proliferate proceeding time and 
litigation costs.191 In the E.U., the estimated cost of a secondary proceeding for 
a foreign creditor is €2000–5000 (this includes costs of reviewing, defining 
priority rights, compiling documents, liaising between courts).192 The E.U.’s 
Impact Statement Survey indicates that more effective coordination could more 
than halve these costs.193 Additionally, avoiding multiple proceedings will 
reduce the need for the duplication of costs. 
 
 184 Supra Part II.A. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Dewaelheyns & Van Hulle, Filtering Speed, supra note 174, at 383. 
 187 Douglas C. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 778 (2002); 
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subsidiary). 
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the UK 10–11 (Univ. of Cambridge Centre for Bus. Research, Working Paper No. 332) (Mar. 1, 2009), 
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 192 Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment accompanying the document Revision of 
Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, at 29 COM (2012) 416 final (Dec. 12, 2012). 
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1. Liquidators 
In the universalist scenario, there would be one lead liquidator who will 
receive fees as agreed upon. The liquidator’s fee arrangement would be based 
upon the laws and customs of the COMI. Liquidators receive fees based on the 
funds recovered (typically 3% or 5%) or at an hourly rate.194 If secondary 
proceedings are unavoidable, a lead liquidator may need to apportion fees to 
another liquidator, thereby increasing costs. However, a lead liquidator should 
have the ability to intervene in non-main proceedings; prevent them from 
occurring unnecessarily; and most importantly, ensure that secondary 
proceedings do not contravene the interests of the corporate group.195 The EIR 
has a duty for cooperation amongst liquidators,196 but a definite hierarchy 
which allows one liquidator to take control of proceedings and minimize costs 
would be beneficial. 
2. Attorneys & Other Professionals 
In a complicated case, a debtor will hire both financial advisors197 and 
lawyers.198 In both the U.S. and E.U., professional fees require authorization, 
but jurisdictions vary on how and to whom such authorization is granted.199 
Furthermore, between E.U. countries, laws may dictate different fee structures 
for liquidators and administrators. The rules for liquidators also differ between 
the U.S. and E.U.  
A larger corporate group will have more contracts, employees, assets, and 
other issues to deal with, and professionals set their rates based on the 
estimated, or the actual time the matters require.200 A complex cross-border 
case can be very lucrative for the professionals, because it requires proceedings 
in different courts and fee schedules under different legal regimes.201 Studies 
have indicated that the debtor’s size and the number of professionals retained 
have a greater impact on the total fees incurred than the speed of the 
 
 194 John Armour et al., supra note 190, at 11–12.  
 195 Legislative Guide, supra note 65, at 9, 19–20. 
 196 EIR, supra note 34, at art. 31; Legislative Guide, supra note 56, at 6–7. 
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 198 Stephen J. Lubben, The Chapter 11 Attorneys, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 447 (2012). 
 199 Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 174. 
 200 Lubben, supra note 176, at 168. 
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proceedings.202 Avoiding secondary proceedings and the need to hire 
redundant professionals per country will minimize costs. 
D. Case Examples 
Each corporate group case offers unique circumstances that make their 
outcomes difficult to compare.203 Projecting a baseline empirical outcome 
before insolvency proceedings may prove difficult, and any assumptions made 
may prove faulty as the proceedings unwind. However, based on the discussion 
above, there are several objective factors that serve as indicia of successful 
proceedings. Such indicia include single proceedings (or at least minimizing 
secondary proceedings), successful cooperation, limiting the length of 
proceedings, and minimal professional fees incurred. 
1. Global Sales 
A sale of all the assets of an insolvent group proves the easiest route for 
successful evaluation: comparison of the projected value of assets and the sale 
price. Collins & Aikman was one such example.204 In re Smurfit-Stone 
Container Corp.205 is an example of a successful U.S.-Canada insolvency. 
Smurfit-Stone was one of North America’s leading packaging 
manufacturers.206 It employed over 20,000 people.207 In its insolvency, there 
were two proceedings opened, in Delaware and Canada on the same day.208 
The courts approved a cross-border protocol between the Delaware and 
Canadian courts.209 The company was able to exit bankruptcy in less than 
seven months.210 Upon doing so, it was sold to Rock Tenn Co. for $3.5 billion. 
 
 202 Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Reorganization & Professional Fees, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 77, 80 (2008) 
(“time spent in chapter 11 seems to have very little independent effect on the costs of the case. Factors like the 
size of the debtor corporation, the number of professionals retained, and whether a committee is appointed 
play much bigger roles”). 
 203 See supra text accompanying note 178. 
 204 Supra text accompanying notes 168–77. 
 205 In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., No. 09-10235 (BLS), 2010 WL 2403793 (Bankr. D. Del. June 
11, 2010). 
 206 Id. at *1. 
 207 Amir Kurtovic, Bankruptcy Aids Smurfit-Stone Value in Rare Deal: Biggest Deals of 2011, ST. LOUIS 
BUS. J. (Dec. 16, 2011), available at http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/print-edition/2011/12/16/bankruptcy-
aids-smurfit-stone-value-in.html?page=all. 
 208 In re Smurfit, 2010 WL 2403793, at *1.  
 209 Order Approving Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol, In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., No. 09-
10235 (Bankr. D. Del Mar. 12, 2009).  
 210 Kurtovic, supra note 207.  
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This value was higher than expected during the bankruptcy and about a 27% 
premium to shareholders.211 Though the case was a parallel proceeding, the 
two courts’ actions were in full coordination with one and another and offer an 
example of successful protocols.212 
On the other hand, one of the E.U.’s first insolvencies under the EIR, 
KPNQwest, was a cross-border sale that garnered creditors significantly less 
than there likely would been under a single coordinated procedure. KPNQwest 
owned cables across several European countries.213 The parent company was in 
the Netherlands, but several subsidiaries in other E.U. member states opened 
proceedings.214 The Dutch trustee did not have power to coordinate the 
subsidiaries’ proceedings.215 Each proceeding had its own representative and 
liquidations took place in a disaggregate form.216 Each representative took the 
course that he thought would elicit the highest returns for the creditors.217 
Thus, the representatives acted without consideration that the assets’ value in 
that nation were only a component of a more valuable cross-border entity. The 
sale proceeds were lower than had liquidations resolved as a single unit.218 
2. Complications in Proceedings 
Other cases that involved complex issues (fraud), such as Stanford Bank219 
and Lernout & Hauspie,220 have created further problems for insolvency 
proceedings. In Stanford International Bank, the English court refused to 
recognize the U.S. court-appointed receiver as a foreign representative or 
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recognize the proceedings as a collective proceeding because of the 
involvement of the Securities and Exchange Commission to prevent fraud.221 
Nortel Networks is another case that receives both positive and negative 
evaluations. Positively, Nortel was a successful universalist proceeding.222 
Nortel employed 30,000 people, with operations and customers across 150 
countries.223 The parent company filed in Canada, the European subsidiaries 
filed in the U.K., and the U.S. subsidiaries filed in Delaware.224 The Delaware 
bankruptcy court recognized the Canadian and the U.K. proceedings as foreign 
main proceedings under chapter 15, on the premise that Canada was the COMI 
of the Nortel parent and the U.K. was the COMI of the European 
subsidiaries.225 The three proceedings were able to successfully facilitate the 
sale of Nortel’s extensive patent assets.226 Nortel would have been very 
complicated in the disaggregated form because of how intertwined the assets of 
the company (networks) were. Nonetheless, after the sales, there were still 
disputes between the different affiliates with competing interests.227 The result 
has been ongoing litigation in different countries, and a boon for the 
professionals who continue getting fees from the estates.228 
3. U.S. Proceedings 
There are relatively few reported U.S. decisions involving inter-company 
claims.229 When a proceeding is opened in the U.S., the chapter 11 plan will 
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often deal with the claims to avoid post-proceedings litigation.230 Other U.S. 
cases will reorganize, but have suboptimal results because of the complexity of 
disjointed proceedings. One such example is Global Crossing.231 The company 
ultimately reorganized successfully, but it was a very expensive proceeding 
because it had parallel proceedings in the U.S. and Bermuda and required 
coordination for each of the sixteen subsidiaries involved.232 
In re General Growth Properties233 was a successful coordination of a 
diffuse corporate group reorganization, in retrospect. However, the court’s 
approach and the blurring of entity separateness garnered criticism.234 General 
Growth was the second-largest mall owner in the U.S. with 180 properties in 
forty-three states.235 The parent corporation managed properties throughout the 
U.S. and had hundreds of subsidiaries.236 Creditors objected to including all of 
the entities together, because the entities included Special Purpose Entities who 
themselves were solvent, and the reorganization plan allowed all the cash to 
flow upstream to the parent during the reorganization.237 The court nonetheless 
approved the plan, which treated the debtor as a single entity.238 The court 
stated that it was not substantively consolidating all the entities, but 
consolidating the proceedings for administrative efficiency.239 The court 
focused on whether the joint filing was in good faith, and one commentator has 
suggested that evaluation of the good faith of the filing could be a model for 
how a court could consider whether a de facto substantive consolidation240 is 
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appropriate for cross-border filings,241 since such an approach prioritizes the 
interests of the group as a whole. Nonetheless, many creditors and scholars 
have expressed concern because the creditors’ expectations that the Special 
Purpose Entities would be treated separately were contravened.242 After the 
bankruptcy, General Growth paid back its creditors in full, provided some 
recovery to its shareholders, and spun off a large portion of its properties under 
a new name.243 
Despite the ample criticism of the court’s legal approach in General 
Growth, the criticism does not undercut the economic benefit of its universalist 
approach. While the integrity of the legal system is an important virtue, the 
reorganization’s success should provoke some questioning of the insistence of 
utmost respect to legal separateness. A better policy to unflagging reverence 
would be one that considers creditors’ reasonable expectations but prioritizes 
economic efficiency to legal formalities. 
In the absence of a standardized policy for E.U.-U.S. cross-border 
insolvencies, there are several private mechanisms and rules by which a 
corporate group can ensure its proceedings maximize their efficiency and 
minimize costs. 
IV.  GUIDELINES FOR E.U.-U.S. CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY CASES 
Protocols are a means to achieve the efficient universalist goal absent laws. 
Protocols are flexible tools which can reflect the needs of the parties and 
ensure predictability and cooperation based on private agreement. This Part 
discusses how protocols can be used effectively and discusses the first 
successful worldwide protocol: Maxwell Communications. This Part then 
discusses how the insolvency administrator can most efficiently execute the 
insolvency given the considerations discussed above. 
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A. CoCo Guidelines 
European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-border 
Insolvency244 (known as the “CoCo Guidelines”) provide guidance for dealing 
with insolvencies that pans across several E.U. jurisdictions.245 The guidelines 
provide clarity to items left vague in the EIR.246 These guidelines are not 
binding, but are “a framework to realize the objective of enabling liquidators 
and courts to efficiently and effectively operate in cross-border insolvency 
proceedings.”247 
The CoCo Guidelines outline the role of the liquidator, communication, 
information exchange, notices, among many other things.248 Primarily, these 
guidelines emphasize the collaborative spirit of the Article 31 of the EIR to 
achieve efficiency.249 Although following the CoCo Guidelines help make 
proceedings more efficient, the guidelines nonetheless recommend the use of 
protocols to span aspects not covered in the guidelines.250 
B. Protocols 
Protocols are private agreements between the parties that are then endorsed 
by the court.251 They help facilitate the proceedings, clarify expectations, and 
add overall harmony to the insolvency proceedings.252 These agreements may 
be oral or written, and range in their scope; they address the procedure but do 
not decide substantive issues.253 The UNCITRAL Practice Guide encourages 
the use of protocols and also for transnational courts to cooperate together to 
approve and successful execute these protocols.254 Ideally, these agreements 
would be reached prior to the commencement of any proceedings; however 
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this is not always possible because of the speed at which a corporate group’s 
financial condition deteriorates.255 
Implementing protocols not only gives parties a chance for efficient private 
ordering, 256 but gives some guarantee of reducing the cost of litigation and 
allows parties to focus on the insolvency proceedings during the case rather 
than how to manage conflicts of law issues or cooperate with foreign parties.257 
UNCITRAL estimates that in one notable case, Everfresh,258 the use of 
protocols enhanced the value in the proceedings by over 40%.259 Examples of 
successful protocol implementation are readily available as useful guidance.260 
One of the most successful (and first) examples of a protocol for a 
worldwide liquidation was Maxwell Communications.261 Maxwell filed for 
chapter 11 in the U.S., and entered into a protocol with the English 
administrators.262 The case involved $2 billion in assets and over $4 billion in 
liabilities.263 Following the protocol, the U.S. examiner and the U.K. 
administrator completed the proceedings with “unprecedented cooperation.”264 
The protocol provided that all the assets would be pooled together, rather than 
carved out for each court.265 Creditors in either country could then submit their 
claims to their respective court.266 Despite the size of the assets at issue, there 
were hardly any material conflicts, and the court described it as a “remarkable” 
orderly liquidation.267 
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The contents of protocols depends on the needs of the parties. Protocols’ 
flexibility caters to those needs. Protocols should establish what information 
the parties must share and how they will do so.268 Protocols can also include 
mechanisms to preserve asset value, policies on how to administer claims, 
procedures to handle intercompany claims, and meetings among the 
signatories.269 Communication between the parties and the courts is one of the 
most palpable problems. E.U. surveys showed that although cooperation and 
communication is encouraged by the EIR, it generally is insufficient and 
poorly coordinated.270 Protocols can ensure that the parties pre-determine 
exactly how, when, and with whom such communications must happen.271 The 
communications provisions should stipulate the time, place, and manner of 
communication; what kind of notice is necessary for communication; which 
parties have a right to participate and are entitled to notice; confidentiality; 
what goes into the records; and the effects of any given communication.272 
Additionally, protocols can, as did the Maxwell protocols, specify how to 
coordinate hearings and ensure that different courts are not resolving the same 
issues.273 Parties privately agreeing to protocols not only helps courts minimize 
disputes and maximize asset value, but also increases court efficiency and the 
need for a judge’s involvement. 
C. Insolvency Administrator Guidelines 
The administrator of insolvency will vary from country to country.274 Most 
European countries have a liquidator in charge of overseeing the process.275 In 
Canada, a monitor will be appointed.276 This would be akin to the appointment 
of a U.S. Trustee or a receiver. Regardless of the representative’s title and 
responsibilities, she will play a pivotal role in organizing the liquidation or 
reorganization proceedings.277 The representative must have a clear and 
distinct authority to undertake the role as coordinator for ensuring 
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cooperation.278 Effective cooperation includes cooperation with the court, other 
representatives, other courts, and coordination amongst creditors.279 
For a corporate group, the ideal would be the appointment of a single, or 
lead, representative.280 While other representatives may have dealings with 
creditors in their respective nations, the lead representative will have the 
ultimate power to ensure that all actions are in the best interest of the estate as 
a whole, but still ensure that no one creditor’s in rem rights are sacrificed.281 A 
focus on the corporate group worldwide, rather than multiple administrators 
fighting for their insular interests, will provide more coherent and efficient 
management of the insolvency.282 
One step for a lead representative then is to understand the local laws, and 
be able to foresee what kind of synthetic proceedings may be necessary or 
possible, and how to ensure creditors’ in rem rights are left intact. A court 
recognizing the main proceedings may turn over assets to a foreign 
representative.283 The representative is responsible for the administration of the 
proceedings, the distribution of assets, and administering the assets that are 
part of the estate, unless subject to other local laws.284 
Another priority for protocols is to establish the protocols by which all the 
representatives will communicate with one and other. EIR Article 31 already 
mandates that liquidators in the E.U. communicate with each other, but there 
are no stipulations as to how they must do so. Detail on communications will 
ensure orderly proceedings; additionally, Article 31 does not bind U.S. 
representatives.285 Administrators should get notice of any secondary 
proceedings that are opened. Notice will prevent the administrator from 
missing the opportunity to get a stay for secondary proceedings that would 
disrupt efficient proceedings. The English administrators in Nortel requested 
that the English courts send letters to all other E.U. member courts to give the 
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English administrators notice of any secondary proceedings and an opportunity 
to be heard on the matter.286 The Nortel administrators were granted such 
authorization because the administrators argued before the court that it was 
necessary for the maximization of the integrated proceedings.287 
Recently, some commentators have also suggested mandatory arbitration 
for parties, to avoid the prolonged and costly litigation that may arise from 
substantive disputes detracting from efficient liquidation.288 While mandatory 
arbitration may go too far, encouraging private and early arbitration would be 
consistent with the spirit of cooperation outside of court. 
CONCLUSION 
Under current insolvency law, the most efficient insolvency procedure 
requires voluntary cooperation of all the parties involved. The Model Law, 
when employed to achieve a single proceedings, has proven to be an effective 
tool for efficient universalist procedures.289 Single proceedings are the most 
cost-effective means of insolvency, but because of the complexity and 
diversity of corporate groups’ structures, it is difficult to ordain a universal 
approach to deal with every corporate group insolvency. This Article has 
highlighted some of the key problems and issues that arise for corporate group 
insolvencies and how they can be dealt with efficiently. Employing tools such 
as the CoCo Guidelines and protocols can help establish predictability and a 
common goal amongst the debtor, creditors, and courts. Predictability and 
accord among all parties will help achieve a better insolvency outcome for the 
debtor, the creditors, and the overall economy. 
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